Post-unification Inter-Korean Intercultural Communication: Examining the Impact of History Education on New Identity Formation*

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Abstract

How will the reunification of Korea impact the population and enable them to confront their history and recognize themselves as citizens of a new Unified Korea? As cultural identity is ubiquitous in intercultural communication and across social science disciplines, this study seeks to analyze the formation of different identities in both North Korea and South Korea during the almost 70 years of division. This analysis will focus on the distinct interpretations of three major topics by both Koreas: 1) Korean Mythology, specifically, the Myth of Dangun, 2) the Perceived Meaning of Independence, and 3) the Korean War-comparisons which have been ignored by most of the research to date related to the Korean Peninsula.

Intercultural communication attempts to establish reciprocity through the exchange of information and values between parties hitherto unknown to each other. In this process, it is vital to examine which historical elements of the Koreas that can be employed to reduce nationalistic and ethnocentric views and stereotypes, to develop mutual positive perceptions, to promote reconciliation, and to facilitate conflict resolution and form common regional perspectives. This study will focus on ideology, individual identity and intercultural communication to analyze the current relationship between the history education and social identity formation of both Koreas. As such, it will examine how each social identity formation can provide narratives about the transformation of former enemy groups from enmity to being considered members of the same society. Korostelina describes North Korean history education as an example of the impact that

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history textbooks can have on the formation of an ideological mode of national identity. What have others said about the impact of Korean history textbooks on the above mentioned topics?

**Keywords**: Post-unification Inter-Korean Intercultural Communication, History Education, identity Formation

### 1. Introduction

For more than a decade, comments on both North Korea and South Korea have been increasing among international investors. Private and public sources of opinion have been predicting North and South Korean reunification as inevitable. These include international political analysts, intelligence councils, economic policy think tanks, North, East Asian, European, American and other cultural historians in publications of studies that. Obviously, this sensitive topic provokes a variety of national and international reactions, pro and con. However, major reports that include such predictions carefully express possible reunification of the Korean Peninsula based on the terms and interests of the Korean people themselves.

When considering such predictions, we are faced with the daunting challenges of reunification after almost 70 years of division without losing hope of re-uniting both countries. How have the people of both Koreas learned about their shared and divided history? How have their different educational contexts regarding history and interpretations of their relationship influenced their identity formation during the past seven decades? In spite of the numerous predictions and comments on inevitable unification, few considerations have paid attention to the pre and post-division history education in both Koreas and its impact on their identity formation from a humanistic cultural approach. In South Korea, most of the related studies were conducted between 1990 and 2006. During this period, a somewhat conciliatory atmosphere evolved between North and South Korea with the emerging civilian government in South Korea (Kang and Shin 1990; Kang 1992; Lee 1993; Yun 1993; Song 1994; Kim 1994; Kim 1995; Min 1996; An 2001; Jung 2006). These historians and political scientists were mainly concerned with
determining the ideal direction that Korean history education should take to establish a unified nation-state and ethnic identity in a South Korean-led unified Korea. Psychologists and anthropologists have also conducted extensive research into identity issues (Jeon 1996; Paek 1997; Grinker 1998). These studies also focus on the possible conflicts, adaptation and acculturation problems of North Koreans in a South Korea-led unified Korea.

As Smith stated, “Whatever the feelings of individuals, it [national identity] provides the dominant criterion of culture and identity, the sole principle of government and the chief focus of social and economic activity” (1991, 70. Cited in Lynne Parmenter 1999, 454). National identity is closely linked to cultural identity. Cultural historians such as Adrian Buzo and Karina Korostelina have attempted to analyze the question of education related to identity formation. Buzo (2006) argues, less optimistically than the above-mentioned positive predictions, that “the equally profound sense of historical and cultural separateness that has developed since 1945 ensures that the division would continue, and that both Koreas would develop as modern states with the promise and threat of war influencing political thinking and state policy at almost every turn” (92). Such different interpretations of history must be considered because they define and have caused the cultural differences between North and South which continue to share the same pre-war ethnic group, language, culture and pre-war history. In the article “History Education and Social Identity”, Korostelina (2008) analyzes the impact of history education content on several aspects of social identity, including forms, modes, and concepts of identity and insists that “history textbooks not only create loyalties and increase salience of particular national or ethnic identity, but also play an important role in the development of the specific forms and meanings of those identities” (25). She argues that “social identity is connected not only with the perception of similarities within an in-group (common history, attitudes, values, etc.), but also with the perception of differences between one's own group and the members of other groups” (26). Both North and South Koreans can belong to an in-group and at the same time, other groups. In terms of sharing pre-war history both are in-groups, but since 1945, both are also other groups. They are ethnically and culturally in-groups, but politically both are other groups because
“while social identity is connected with social categorization of “us” and “others,” the historical relationship between groups can reshape this identity, [...] history of conflicts between groups contributes to the salience of social identity” (Korostelina 2008, 26).

Keinbaum and Grote claimed that even five years after the formal and official German unification happened, questions concerning the reality of German unity were still being raised (1997, 223). Bleiker investigated North Korean defectors’ cases in South Korea and predicted that “The potential for violence contained in antagonistic identity constructs is far more dangerous in Korea than in Germany” (2004, 57). Analyzing the acculturation experience of international students in Western universities, Smith and Khawaja (2011) listed five possible acculturative stressors encountered by international students: language, educational stressors, sociocultural stressors, discrimination and practical stressors (699-713). Due to the 70 years of division, these five stressors might be applied to both Koreas’ sense of being partially “we” and “others”. Grinker (1998) refers to the prevalence of a “master narrative of homogeneity”, which reinforces the belief that the division of the peninsula was imposed from the outside and that unification would immediately recover the lost national unity (4).

This paper aims to examine the process through which the cultural identity of each Korea has been defined and conceptualized during the decades of division through some key questions that have been influencing the understanding of “we” and “other” groups for the citizens of both Koreas. What historic narratives have been taught as history for over seven decades on three specific historical issues? Based on the findings of differences in historical education, what does political and social identity mean to the people of each Korea?

To answer these questions, three major historical events and their interpretations in the history education of both Koreas will be discussed: Dangun, the legendary founder of Korea; the Independence of Korea since the Japanese Occupation (1910-1945); and the Korean War (1950-1953). Most research to date related to the Korean Peninsula has ignored the fundamentally different historical interpretations of these three issues.

This paper is divided into three main sections. The first will discuss the
relationship between history education and socio-cultural identity. Vickers (2005) describes North Korea's history education as an example of the impact that history textbooks can have on the formation of an ideological mode of national identity, while Shin (2006) argues that “both North and South linked nation or national identity to their own legitimacy and appropriated a particular form of a political nation, Communist and Capitalist, respectively”. History education is not objective, thus it cannot hold a monopoly on truth. History education is intimately related to the construction of individual identity and the transmission of collective memory.

The second section focuses on the shared and divided history of both Koreas. In South Korea, Dangun has been taught as a myth based on history, and in the North, as history based on the myth. How has Korea's independence from the Japanese Occupation been taught? In South Korea the independence movement and the Allied victory of WWII brought independence to the Korean Peninsula. In North however, it has been taught that it was the victorious work of Kim Il Sung's father. In South Korean, the Korean War has been taught as caused by the sudden invasion by North Korea. But in the North, their invasion was 'to free the South Korean people suffering under North American imperialism.'

The last section deals with the “We” and “Others” cultural, social and political issues. As Shin noted, both Koreas' ethnic base was taken for granted, but the political notion of the Korean nation was hotly debated and despite the people's strong sense of ethnic homogeneity, Korea still remains divided. In the article “Ideology, Identity, and Intercultural Communication: An Analysis of Differing Academic Conceptions of Cultural Identity”, Kim aims to “discern and explain how investigators vary widely, and sometimes intensively, as to what cultural identity is, what it means in the context of intercultural intergroup relations, and how it is to be researched” (238). She examined some of the more salient identity conceptions of cultural identity, saying that those concepts are compared “according to respective implicit and explicitly articulated underlying assumptions.” How to define and interpret post-war implicit and explicit “We” and “Others” issues in both Koreas and to attract underlying assumptions articulated will be analyzed for inclusion in this paper. Methodologically, North
and South Korea's history education syllabus, South Korean history textbooks and related data and North Korean and North Korean-related materials, to the extent available, will be reviewed.

2. History Education and Socio-cultural Identity

If “Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty” as political scientist Connolly describes the relationship between identity and difference (2002, 64), then how have North and South Korea been trying to distinguish and conceptualize their Communist and Capitalist nature from each other despite their shared pre-war history and identity to claim their own self-certainty? In North Korea, the Kims are undeniably “the alpha and omega of Korean history and teach everything from art to zoology, ... [and] South Korea is neither the whole Self nor the perfect Other of North Korea” (Cho 2011, 323).

History and historic narratives should be differentiated. Liu and Hilton's (2005) study defines the functions of identity-forming history which “provides us with narratives that tell us who we are, where we came from and where we should be going. ... [and] defines a trajectory which helps construct the essence of a group's identity, how it relates to other groups, and ascertains what its options are for facing present challenges” (1). Korostelina (2013) defines historic narratives as those that “provide information about origins and the mission of a nation, define rights and obligations of different groups within a nation, and legitimate social and political structures” (Chapter 1). History education in both Koreas borders between history and historic narratives and competes to determine whose history is more authentic and legitimate. Korostelina (2013) emphasizes the relevance and impact of history education on social identity and defines its three major functions: (1) establishment of connotations of ingroup identity (norms, beliefs and values), (2) justification of intergroup relations and social hierarchies, and (3) legitimization of power structure and mobilization of collective actions.

Both North and South Koreas have been developing their own historic narratives
of the pre- and post-war history in order to justify and rationalize each one's political ideology, while each one's historic narratives have surely formed part of their identities. Erickson (1950, 1968) placed cultural identity at the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his or her “common culture”. For Yinger (1986), ethnic attachment is a “genuine culture” that forms the person's “basic identity” and offers “a sense of historical continuity and embeddedness and a larger existence in a collectivity of one's group”. For De Vos (1990) cultural identity provides “a sense of common origin, as well as common beliefs and values, or common values” and serves as the basis of “self-defining in-groups” (cited in Kim 2007). Kim (2007) defines five different basic themes of cultural identity: (a) an adaptive and evolving entity of an individual, (b) a flexible and negotiable entity of an individual, (c) a discrete social category and individual choice, (d) a distinct and communal system of communicative practices, and (e) a discrete social category and a non-negotiable group right.

Also worthy of analysis are Smith's (1991) and Kellas' (1991) theories of national identity. Smith contrasts two models of national identity: a civic-territorial (Western) model and an ethnic-genealogical (or non-Western) model. The Western model focuses on territory, a legal-political community, a common culture and a common civic ideology. In contrast, the non-Western model gives priority to common descent, ethnicity and blood ties. Smith states that “In the latter model, national identity can be fully retained outside the territory of the nation, and conversely, an outsider can never become a full member of the nation”. Kellas replaces geographical boundaries with the ethnic, social and official nationalism, and, by extension, national identity. Ethnic nationalism is similar to Smith's ethnic-genealogical category. Social nationalism is based on a shared community, a shared culture and social ties. Official nationalism is based on legal citizenship, which implies all those legally entitled to be citizens regardless of ethnicity, identity or culture. According to Smith's category, both Koreas' identities belong to an ethnic-genealogical, i.e. non-Western model. Smith's geographical boundaries can be replaced by ethnic and social nationalism in the case of Korea. Both identities are based on blood ties and common descent, perpetuated from Dangun in Korea.
Shin (2006) describes the homogeneity-required but extremely different ideologies of North and South Koreas as follows:

“After colonial rule, the (ethnic) nation became a primary source of collective identity among Koreans on both sides of the peninsula. Other transnational forces, such as Communism in the North and modernization and globalization in the South, emerged as potentially rival sources of collective identity for Koreans. Yet these transnational forces did not remove or weaken the power of nation or nationalism. On the contrary, they were appropriated for nationalist agendas on both sides. In the North, Koreans were continuously asked to creatively apply Marxism-Leninism to the Korean situation. Such a call for the appropriation of Communism toward the Korean revolution gradually evolved into *juche* ideology, “Socialism of our style,” and “a theory of the Korean nation as number one.” Similarly, in the South, Koreans were asked to devote their energy for “modernization of the fatherland” and, later, for liberalization and globalization to increase national competitiveness in a rapidly globalizing world.”

Various studies have shown that a person's national identity results directly from the presence of common elements in their daily lives, such as national symbols, language, national colors, history, and consciousness, blood ties, culture, music, cuisine, media, etc. These markers are not fixed but fluid, varying from culture to culture and also within a culture's evolution over time. In their cultural identity formation efforts, both Koreas experienced their historical turning point in the early 1990's. South Korea's national identity evolved from the military political currents into supporters of civil government, while North Korea transformed the identity focus from Marxism to *Juche* ideology during the 1990s.

3. Shared and Divided Memories

In the article “Identity, Difference, and the Dilemmas of Inter-Korean Relations: Insights from Northern Defectors and the German Precedent”, Bleiker quotes the
words of a North Korean defector in the South: “I am living in a country where the people look like me and speak the same language, but their lifestyle and mentality are so vastly different that I feel like an alien” (Calvin Sims, ‘Life in South Hard for North Koreans’ (New York Times), December 24, 2000. Cited in Bleiker 2004, 36). Many commentators and predictors of Korean unification draw attention to the remarkable degree of cultural homogeneity in Korea. A quest for national cohesion is understandable, both emotionally and historically. Still, as Bleiker warns, “Deeply entrenched antagonistic identity constructs cannot be changed overnight” (39), because “the strong differences in identity patterns persist, but also, and perhaps more importantly, they persist far beyond the ideological images with which they are associated. They are deeply embedded in people’s assumptions about themselves and the world they live in” (48). As Han and Jeong (1983) argue North Korea is “a passionate revolutionary and an authentic communist [country that] possesses the purest and cleanest [sense of] loyalty and sincerity toward [the Leader, Kim Il Sung] and the Party.” (40. Cited in Ryang 2012, 186). North Korea feels in constant crisis since its ultimate and long-awaited goal, i.e. unification of the Korean Peninsula on its own terms, which requires eliminating the Americans.

Cho (2011) uncovers North Korea’s state identity concealed in ‘Pyongyang’s National Cooperation Discourse’ in the 21st century and then questions the Discourse’s “modes of securing that state identity in pursuit of the Pyongyang regime’s legitimacy in the Korean Peninsula” (311). In North Korea, “It is insufficient simply to obey the Kims in a restrictive sense: in a productive sense, all Koreans must love in the name of patriotism and filial piety, and North Koreans further become systematically infantilized in the bosom of their two Fatherly Leaders” (323).

Stalin said that writers are the engineers of the human soul and they must give the state legitimacy and prestige and instill in the people a cultural identity (Cited in Keinbaum and Grote 1997). Since history can be described through historic narratives, writers of history have surely contributed substantially to state legitimacy and prestige in both Koreas, but even more so in North Korea.

In North Korea, the new version of the history textbook published in 1996
established Pyongyang as the central stage of Korean history “While some histories are quite properly constructed to create or protect identities, they are not history stories” (Carretero, Asensio and Rodriguez-Moneo 2012, XI. Cited in Osborn 2014). In 1947, Dangun’s Grave was found in Gangdonggun, Pyongyang, the current Capital city of North Korea. According to the North Korean history textbook published in the 1990s, Dangun’s Tomb is evidence that Dangun was born in Pyongyang and established Gojoseon (2333 B.C. 108 B.C.) making Pyongyang as Capital (『North Korean history textbook』 2, 22. Cited in An 2001, 30). Dangun ruins appear in old Korean history data, history of Goryeo Dynasty (918-1392) and Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910), therefore the North Korean claim is not entirely a lie. However, there are undeniable doubts about the restoration of the original tomb.

An compares the North Korean description of the Dangun Myth before and after 1996. Before 1996, the North Korean history textbooks state that “The Dangun Myth is a history of Hwanung, son of the Sky, who came to the Korean Peninsula with 3,000 people to have a son who would be the first king of Gojoseon Kingdom. This story is surely made up by the leaders to strengthen their power” (82(3), 36. Cited in An, 51. Translated by the author).

Since 1996 the new North Korean history textbook changed its claim about the Dangun Myth and defends the mythical character of the Dangun Myth as a myth of origin. “The Dangun Tale was formed in the style of literary myth because the people at that time adored Dangun as their original ancestor. The people made up the fact as myth because they did not know the principles of natural law and society” (96(2), 41. Cited in An, 51. Translated by the author).

Malinowski (1926) describes how social representations of history provide myths of origin to satisfy state's needs. “Myth comes into play when rite, ceremony, or a social or moral rule demands justification, warrant of antiquity, reality and sanctity…myth is not only looked upon as a comment of additional information, but it is a warrant, a charter, and even a practical guide to the activities with which it is connected” (Cited in Liu and Hilton 20015, 3)

Moscovici (1988) also describes social representations of history that contain descriptive components, which “include important events and people, woven into
stories with temporal form referred to as *narratives of origin*” (Cited in Liu and Hilton 2005, 4). North and South Korea have been revising educational curricula which reveal the political influence that they have undergone. The North Korean history textbooks published after 1996 basically emphasize the orthodoxy of the North Korean political system which has been connected from Gojoseon (2333 B.C.-108 B.C.) Goguryeo (37 B.C. 668 A.C.) Goryeo (918 1392). In 1993, the North Korean Academy of Social Science published the excavation report of *Dangun's Grave* to raise the figure of *Dangun* as a real person. North Korea's Taedong River Culture theory, which focuses on Pyongyang as the center of Korean history, still lacks academic validation. However, since most of the orthodox socialist countries collapsed during the 1980s, North Korea needed to develop a North Korea-centered ideology *Juche* and abandoned Marxist historical materialism to maintain its own political and social system. In the process, alternatives were required to convince North Korean people of the solidity of the state's system, hence new historic narratives evolved based on the *Juche* ideology that arose. Shin (2006) argues that “Chains of memory, myth, and symbol connect nations to their ethnic heritage, and national identity satisfies the people's need for cultural fulfillment, rootedness, security, and fraternity in the face of tumult.”

North Korea's Taedong River Culture theory constitutes North Korea's national identity with “woven stories” that Moscovici called the *historical narratives*.

There is still a lot of controversy about the *Dangun* Tale among South Korean scholars. The Gojoseon Kingdom, or so named *Dangun* Joseon, was important during the Joseon Dynasty as the nation's root. However, the *Dangun* Tale was denied by both Korean and Japanese colonial historians during the Japanese Occupation (1910-1945). In 2000, when early Bronze Age potteries and earthenware dated about 2000 B.C. were excavated in South Korea, the general recognition of the Bronze Age Culture was created in the South. In February 2007, the South Korean Ministry of Education and Human Resources published an important guideline about the *Dangun* Tale. Earlier the South Korean textbooks described the *Dangun* Tale as “It is said that Dangun founded Gojoseon” , but the new guidelines required this to be amended as “Dangun founded Gojoseon.” However, in the South the *Dangun* Tale is understood as the origin of the whole
nation, without recognizing Pyongyang as the central capital of the whole Peninsula.

Sonya Ryang (2012)'s *Reading North Korea* shows how a society's cultural logic influences people's minds. The Great Leader personifies “love for the people and our people's history and strength” (49). In 1910, the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910) ended when Japan annexed and colonized Korea. Although internal and external independence movements were organized during the Japanese Occupation, both Koreas' narratives regarding how the independence was achieved are quite different. According to North Korean-related information, resistance groups formed in Korea and China, mostly adopting leftist politics in reaction to the right-wing Japanese administration. Both Koreas agree that memories of oppression during the Japanese Occupation continue to hurt and haunt relations between both Koreas and Japan, despite their narratives. Grinker (1998) describes the different “woven” narratives of Korean history as follows:

“The writing of history in Korea has been inextricably tied to a history of domination—in particular [that of] Japanese colonization and imperialism, and to a lesser extent to the relation of the superpowers to Korea's ongoing division, as well as a perceived neocolonial American imperialism. As a consequence, historians have struggled not only to write their histories but also to write against histories that they believe were distorted through the colonial lens of power and control. Of Korean historiography. Kenneth Wells says, “The Chief concern is with the proper or preferred responses to colonialism and imperialism,” (1996, 1) and that therefore Korean histories are imbued with metaphors of power” (140).

As Liu and Hilton (2005) note, “... ethnic and national identities are often formed when disparate groups unify to achieve some shared goal, such as defending themselves against a shared opponent “ (8). Before the division, Korea had a goal of independence and Japanese Occupation is still a shared opponent for North and South. Oberdorfer and Carlin (2014)'s *The Two Koreas* gives us clear scenarios of the division of the Korean Peninsula, which occurred at the end of the World War II and simultaneously, the termination of the Japanese
Occupation of Korea:

“...the division of Korea occurred in the final days of World War II. The United States, Britain, and China had declared in the Cairo Declaration in 1943 that "in due course, Korea shall become free and independent." And at the 1945 Yalta Conference President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed a US-Soviet-Chinese trusteeship over Korea. ... Only in the last week of the war when the Soviet Union finally declared war on Japan and sent its troops into Manchuria and northern Korea, did the United States give serious consideration to its postwar policy in the peninsula. Suddenly, Washington realized that Russian occupation of Korea would have important military implications for the future of Japan and East Asia.”

Oberdorfer and Carlin's description of Korean independence fundamentally differs from North Korea's argument. Three years later, on August 15, 1948, the US-backed Republic of Korea was officially proclaimed. The Soviet-backed Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the North, was proclaimed on September 9, 1948. Different from the North's claim that Kim Jung Il continued the blood lineage of Anti Japanese Revolutionists Kim Il Sung and Kim Jung Suk, Oberdorfer and Carlin describes Kim Il Sung as “a thirty-three-year old Korean guerilla commander who initially fought the Japanese in China but had spent the last year of WWII in Manchuria training camps commanded by the Soviet army.”

The division began the war in 1950 as a civil war, but it ended as an international war in 1953. The North proclaims that “Owing to the US armed invasion on June 25, [...] On July 27, Juche 42 (1953), the US imperialists finally knelt down before the Korean people and the KPA (Korean People's Army) and signed the Armistice Agreement. Accordingly, the 3-year-long Korean War ended with a great victory of the Korean people.” In the South, the contrary is understood that “The Korean War both solidified and vastly deepened the division of Northeast Asia,” as did the war caused by “the North Korean invasion in 1950” (Cummings 2005).

A former US Foreign Service Officer Gregory Henderson summarizes the post-war Koreas:
“No division of a nation in the present world is so astonishing in its origin as the division of Korea; none is so unrelated to conditions or sentiment within the nation itself at the time division was effected; none is to this day so unexplained; in none does blunder and planning oversight appear to have played so large a role. Finally, there is no division for which the U.S. government bears so heavy a share of the responsibility as it bears for the division of Korea” (Cited in Oberdoerfer and Carlin 2014).

4. “We” and “Others”

Social identity is a person's sense of themselves and is based on their group membership. Tajfel (1979) proposed that the groups that people belong to are an important source of pride and self-esteem. Groups give us a sense of social identity, a sense of belonging to the social world. Cultural identity is simply a sense of self. Clark (2011) clearly explains how cultural identities enable us to approach the Korean shared and divided identity:

“Cultural identities are marked by a number of factors-'race', ethnicity, gender and class to name but a few, they very real locus of these factors, however, is the notion of difference. The question of difference is emotive, we start to hear ideas about 'us' and 'them', friend and foe, belonging and not belonging, in-groups and out-groups, which define 'us' in relation to others, or the Other” (510).

The previously mentioned positive predictions of Korea's unification argue that both Koreas belong to ethnically and culturally in-groups, i.e. “we”. However, each one's history education narratives emphasize the other's “Otherness” in order to legitimize their superiority. Korea's pre- and post-war shared and divided history make both neither the whole self nor the perfect other. Social identity depends on the situational context as shown in historical narratives of both Koreas. Culturally, different interpretations of the shared history enable us to predict Smith and Khawaja's five possible acculturative stressors, i.e. language, educational
stressors, sociocultural stressors, discrimination and practical stressors in both Koreas' sense of being “we” and “others”, due to each one's social and political identity formation. The Dangun Tale provides a common sense of origin, but it has been politicized and has split the collective identity based on the ethnic nation concept among Koreans on the North and South. The shared history of both sides grants the ethnic-geneological model of national identity. But their divided history imposes a legal-political and civic-territorial model of national identity. The Japanese occupation, the shared goal of independence, as well as a shared opponent, took on separate interpretations for each side after the division of the country. Finally, the Korean War stands out as a climax of ideological legitimization of both sides. “The main function of history education is to provide identity, cohesion, and social purpose, ... [and] teaching about the shared past is a major factor in the formation of national, ethnic, religious, and regional identities” (Korostelina 2013, 109). Intentionally woven interpretations of the shared past through history education in the divided Peninsula define trajectories which help both sides to determine the essence of each one's own we/us concepts of identity in order to be able to relate to each one's Other. Relating to and recognizing each one's “Other” requires recognition of the necessary Other to define their “we.”
Works Cited


