Abstract

This paper is an attempt to search for a meta-theoretical foundation to an integrated Korean studies. Without its own target and methodology, it will be difficult for Korean studies to be established as an independent academic discipline. In particular, the antagonism of the ‘Two Cultures,’ referring to the juxtaposition between humanities and the sciences, has been reproduced into a humanities-based ‘National studies’ (‘國學’) and a social science-based ‘Korean studies’ (‘韓國學’), and is acting as a factor preventing a more holistic perspective of Korean society. Such division originated from the modern academic disciplinary structure systemized at the end of the 19th century but was then deepened by the path dependency of the division system and the external dependency of the Korean academia. Under this context, this paper seeks to graft critical naturalism of Marx and Durkheim, who envisioned unified sciences at the end of the 19th century, before separation into modern academic disciplines took place, to the attempts to alleviate the ‘Two Cultures’ and thereby project an integrated Korean studies. Critical naturalism of the two thinkers – in particular, their relational social paradigm and theory of explanatory critique – proposes a third way that resolves the dichotomies between society and people, science and philosophy, nomothetic and idiographic methods, and facts and values, thus positioning itself as a paradigmatic basis for unified knowledge that overcomes the antagonism between hyper-naturalist positivism and anti-naturalist humanities. Moreover, the critical naturalism of the two provides the possibility of depth-explanatory human sciences that integrates the historicity and the scientificty of a divided
society as well as abundant philosophy of science resources to promote a more complete Korean studies that encompasses both the South and the North.

Key words: Two Cultures, critical naturalism of Marx and Durkheim, explanatory critique, depth-explanatory human sciences, integrated Korean studies

1. Debate on Consilience Within the Korean Academia and ‘Two Cultures’

During the past decade, triggered by the translation by Professor Choe Jae-Chun in 2004 of E. Wilson’s *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge* (1998), there was a heated debate within the Korean academia about unity of knowledge aiming resolve the issue of ‘Two Cultures’1) — namely the dichotomy between humanities and science. Korean studies is no exception to such ‘Two Cultures’ —the conflict between hyper-naturalism and anti-naturalism. In contemporary Korean studies, there is a clear severance between humanities and social science. The secession between humanities-based ‘National studies’ (‘國學’) and social science-based ‘Korean studies’ (‘韓國學’) is acting as an important factor preventing Korean studies from gaining a more holistic perspective of Korea. For example, Korea’s history, culture, language and ideology are dealt as important fields in humanities, while institutions, constitution, democracy, peace and international relations are dealt as part of social sciences. Such circumstances lead to two separate perceptions of a single Korean problem, clearly manifesting the limitations of Korean humanities and social sciences. In this respect, the failure to propose alternatives to today’s Korean problems is in part due to the lack of dialogue

1) As is well known, the concept of ‘Two Cultures’ was used by Snow (2001) to criticize the separation and conflict between ‘sciences’ and ‘humanities’ in his Rede lecture at Cambridge University in 1959. ‘Science’ comes from the Latin ‘scientia’ and means ‘knowledge based on cause and effect’ or ‘causal perception.’ (Wallace 1972, 6) Since ancient Greece, ‘causality’ or ‘cause and effect’ were core elements defining science as well as being the aim of science itself. Likewise, the major objective of humanities is to attain a holistic perspective encompassing nature and humans. However, the concept of humanities commonly used in Korean society nowadays is not one defined in terms of East Asian traditions but one that originated from the Western usage. In particular, humanities as a discipline, which was formulated after the divergence between humanities and sciences — sometimes referred to as philosophy and science — that had already begun to take place at the end 18th century and beginning of 19th century, is exerting influence all around the world. (Paik, 2011, 22)
between social sciences and humanities. In particular, the juxtapositions between social sciences and humanities, between nomothetic methods and idiographic methods, and between facts and values are barring consensus being forged on the definition of the concept of Korean studies (Kim, Kyung-Il 2003, 132; Kim, Sung-Bo 2011, 299; Park, Myung-Rim 2011, 81).

As Wallerstein (1991) had detected earlier on, ‘Two Cultures,’ centered upon the division between science and philosophy, nomothetic and idiographic methods, and facts and values, was also the result of limitations of the disciplinary system innate in the process of the modern capitalist world system being established. However, the reality of the division system in Korea, which has had a stronghold for more than 60 years, forced both social sciences and humanities to become immersed in ‘objectivist,’ ‘positivist’ and ‘value-neutral’ disciplines that are alienated from social realities (Refer to Lim, Hyoung-Taek 2014, 21-23), accelerating the division within the culture of science. Therefore, the search for a meta-theoretic basis of an integrated Korean studies that can surpass the methodology divided by the Two Cultures is a prerequisite for eventually overcoming the incomplete ‘National studies’ (‘國學’), going beyond the modern disciplinary system and heading toward a complete ‘Korean studies’ (‘韓國學’) that encompasses both the South and the North, based on consilience. (Kim Sung-Min, 2010)

Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to graft critical naturalism of Marx and Durkheim, who had envisioned an integrated from of science at the end of the 19th century – before the separation into modern disciplines - with the present day debate on unity of knowledge and prospects of an integrated Korean studies. One of the core ideas of Marx, who laid the cornerstone of a new science on history motivated by development of natural sciences, was prospecting the unity of all sciences. Marx’s ‘history science’ developed without dividing the sciences and humanities, or natural sciences and social sciences - characteristic of a liberalist

2) The term that first appeared as the definition of Korean studies was ‘ponkukhak’ during the period just before Japanese colonialism. After colonization, the term ‘chosŏnhak’ was used. After liberation in 1945, ‘National studies’ (‘國學’) had settled, and then since 1960s, the term that is familiar to us today, ‘Korean studies’ (‘韓國學’), started to become common. For a detailed discussion on the origin and genealogy of Korean studies, refer to Kim, Kyung-Il (2003).
culture - and economics, technological engineering, physics and the like were all proactively united with social sciences. Such unity is expressed in Marx’s *Capital* (1867) (Bernal, 1995: 105). Also at the center of the ideas of Durkheim, who played a decisive role in institutionalizing ‘sociology’ as a single discipline, lie alleviation of the dualist bias that had taken hold since Kant and strong visions of re-division and re-integration of all fields within social sciences (Kim Myung-Hee, 2015b). In particular, Durkheim’s doctoral dissertation, *Division of Labor in Society* (1893), is known to be a work for the first time attempting an integrative scientific approach toward changes in the capitalist system at the turn of the century (Min Moon-Hong, 2012: 684, 722-723; Tiryakian, 2009). Most importantly, his concept of ‘science’ sought unity between natural sciences and human sciences, unlike reductionist scientism, consistently basing itself on anti-reductionist naturalism that respects the uniqueness and autonomy of human sciences. Based on this aspect, I had previously reconstructed, from a critical realist perspective, the elements of ‘naturalist social science’ of the two scholars that were formed in the process of rejecting the dualist bias itself (Kim, Myung-Hee 2014; Kim, Myung-Hee 2015a).  

3) In this sense, naturalist social science refers to the stance that scientific research can be performed on social lives. However, for a long time, the social science methodologies of Marx and Durkheim were understood to be mutually unrelated under the hegemony of a positivist science paradigm. I conceptualized such irony as the ‘Marx and Durkheim’s dilemma.’ This dilemma refers not to the dilemma of Marx and Durkheim ‘themselves’ but of the dualist interpretative structure and epistemological dilemma brought on by the philosophy of positivist science. It includes the following three closely intertwined dimensions. First, there is the dilemma that there are ‘two Marxes’ and ‘two Durkheims’ in the sense that there is an epistemological gap between a younger Marx and an older Marx, between early Durkheim and later Durkheim. It is supported by the dichotomous exchange between idealism and materialism, between voluntarism and determinism, and between philosophy and science, and is also a dilemma that is shared, in most parts, by individualistic sociology of the US and positivism within Marxism. Second, there is the dichotomous dilemma surrounding the relationship between natural sciences and social sciences in terms of their target and ‘scientific methods.’ It is manifested mostly in the form of a conflict between a hyper-naturalist interpretation and an anti-naturalist interpretation of Marx’s and Durkheim’s methodologies. Third is the dichotomous dilemma between fact and value in relation to the position and role of social sciences, and science and critique. This form of dilemma refers to the dilemma of interpretation among researchers, caused by the doctrine of value-neutrality, considered ideal in standard science models, paradoxically functioning as tacit criteria for evaluating the ‘scientificity’ of social science methodologies of Marx and Durkheim, who attempted to integrate science and critique, and judgement of facts and values. In fact, such dichotomies are meta-theoretical hypotheses tacitly shared within contemporary sociology, derived from empirical realism, which is a implicit form of realism within positivist view of science. It can be found in the ‘antinomy of classical sociology’ formalized by Alexander, who transformed and succeeded the thesis of the ‘two Marxes’ and ‘two Durkheims’ – that there are epidemiological gaps within each of the theoretical developmental processes of Marx and Durkheim – and the thesis of convergence of Parsons (Alexander 1982, 81-82). Refer to Kim, Myung-Hee (2015a) for further details.
The reasons why critical realism can become the meta-theoretical basis for viable forms of integrated science and integrated Korean studies are as follows. Traditional naturalism, by not separating epistemology and ontology, takes on the form of ontological naturalism (as in the example of Wilson). Also, the ideas of ‘unified science’ of logical positivism seeks only strict epistemological consistency and logical and methodological procedures, by directly applying natural science methodologies, modelled on physics and mathematics, to social. On the other hand, critical realism proposes a philosophy of social science that differentiates but at the same time, integrates ontology, epistemology and axiology— in other words, the road of critical naturalism. In particular, this paper seeks to project the feasibility of integrated Korean studies by restoring, from a critical naturalist perspective, the concept of ‘science’ of the two scholars – a concept that overcomes the dichotomies of ‘natural sciences versus human sciences,’ ‘nomothesis versus idiography’ and ‘facts versus values,’ which are the major points of gridlock within presentday debates on unity of knowledge.

To this end, first of all, Part 2 will reveal that, with the support of critical realism, the juxtaposition between the hyper-naturalism of positivist social science and the anti-naturalism of humanities can be resolved through the relational social paradigm of Marx and Durkheim. Part 3 will discuss the idea that the concept of ‘science’ of the two thinkers not only rejects the dichotomy between science and philosophy, and facts and values, but can also complementarily link the two sides through the project of ‘explanatory critique,’ which integrates social scientific explanation and social theoretical critique. In Part 4, I will discuss what implications and possibilities Marx’s and Durkheim’s critical naturalism hold for relieving of the ‘Two Cultures’ and projecting an integrated Korean studies.

2. Social Structure and Human Agency: Relational Social Paradigm

Majority of the dichotomies that surround present debates on unity of knowledge fundamentally come from the field of dualist problems within contemporary
philosophy of science. They are reproduced under the hegemony of positivist philosophy of science that had dominated three-quarters of the 20th century. On the other hand, critical realist view of science proposes a way for these dichotomies to re-integrate, thereby endowing consistency and presentness to the social science philosophies of Marx and Durkheim.

To encapsulate, critical naturalism aims to overcome the dichotomies and dualisms that dominate human sciences. (1) The overriding dichotomy or split was between a hyper-naturalistic positivism and anti-naturalistic hermeneutics, resolved in the generation of a qualified critical naturalism. (2) Then there was the split between individualism and collectivism (or holism), which critical naturalism would resolve by seeing society relationally and emergent. (3) A connected split, upon which the debate about structure and agency was joined, was between the voluntarism and the reification. This critical naturalism would transcend in its transformational model of social activity. (4) Then there was the dichotomy between facts and values, most sharply expressed in Hume’s law, which critical naturalism would refute in its theory of explanatory critiques. (5) Then, fuelling the positivism/hermeneutics debate, was the dichotomy between reasons and causes, which critical naturalism would resolve by showing how, once one rejected Human causality, reasons could be causes sui generis on a critical realist conception of causality. (6) Finally underpinning many of these dichotomies was the dualism between mind and body (or, more macroscopically, between society and nature), which critical naturalism would overcome, by seeing mind as an emergent power of matter in its synchronic emergent power materialism (Bhaskar 1998a, xiii-xiv). Through such processes, critical realism proposes a social science explanatory model that brings together, in a new way, ontology, epistemology (methodology) and axiology.

Interestingly, the earlier works of Marx and Durkheim show clearly the process of critical naturalism being formulated in the course of resolving the dualist dichotomies such as that between nature and humans, empiricism and idealism, and facts and values – in other words, the dilemma following Kant. Such effort was formalized into ‘historical science’ and ‘human naturalism’ for Marx, and into ‘moral science’ and ‘sociological naturalism’ for Durkheim (Kim, Myung-Hee
2015a). In particular, the ontological contemplation of the two scholars on ‘the social,’ which is the object of social science, acts as a decisive occasion in regard to the transition towards critical naturalism that accepts both the uniformity as well as the difference between natural sciences and social sciences. Marx and Durkheim were against both the philosophical idealism (anti-naturalism) of their time that shared the perspective of humans as ‘isolated individuals’ as well as the empiricism of economics (hyper-naturalism), and consolidated the relational dimension of social beings that are a part of nature but at the same time maintain their own unique freedom and the emergent properties as important premises in social science. Both considered the existing social system to be a particular social form in transition, and considered the emergent properties of society/people relations that have newly appeared in the historical horizon of a modern society as being historical and scientific premises of a critique of political economy.

In fact, the essence of the major works of the two thinkers, *Capital* (1867) and *Division of Labor in Society* (1893), is the criticism of the static perspective of history, which is the inevitable result of methodological individualism innate in political economics of their time. For example, Marx, in criticizing the methodological individualism of Hegelian philosophy and classical political economics, said, “Society does not consist of individuals [or, we might add, groups], but expresses the sum of the relations within which individuals [and groups] stand” (Marx 1973, 265).

To be a slave and to be a citizen are social determinations, relations between human beings A and B. Human being A as such is not a slave. He is a slave in and through society (Marx 1973, 265).

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4) Refer to the following excerpts from Marx and Durkheim, who share a dynamic model of historical development: “[...] scientific analysis of the capitalist mode of production demonstrates the contrary, that it is a mode of production of a special kind, with specific historical features; [...] that the production relations corresponding to this specific, historically determined mode of production — relations which human beings enter into during the process of social life, in the creation of their social life — possess a specific, historical and transitory character; and, finally, that the distribution relations essentially coincident with these production relations are their opposite side, so that both share the same historically transitory character” (Marx 2004, 1065-1066). “For it to have a limit, it would be necessary for the milieu to become stationary at some given moment. But such an hypothesis is contrary to the most legitimate inductions. As long as there are distinct societies, the number of social units will necessarily be variable in each of them. [...] It is true that this source of variations would be exhausted if all humanity formed one and the same society” (Durkheim 1933, 341).
In other words, social relations can be said to be the way of existence for social realities. Marx’s social ontology is formalized as a realist and relational social model by R. Bhaskar, father of critical realism. According to the relational model of social being, social structure and human behavior are mutually dependent, however, there is an ontological gap, and a non-symmetrical relationship is formed. Society is a condition that exists at all times for human activity and, at the same time, the outcome of continuous reproduction of human activity. This is duality of structure. Praxis is a condition of production – i.e., the conscious production of society - while also usually being unconscious reproduction. This is the duality of praxis. In other words, characteristics of social forms are differentiated from characteristics of individuals, whose activities social forms are dependent upon. This is not a denial of unique aspects of human beings such as aims, intentions, wants and self-consciousness. In the process of people consciously performing human activities, they unconsciously reproduce and/or transform the structure, which controls their actual production activities (Bhaskar 1989, 37).

Likewise, Durkheim, in rejecting methodological individualism, criticized the limitations of nominalism of historians and the extreme realism of philosophers, and said that the errors of the two sides could be overcome through, the idea of ‘social species.’

One escapes from this alternative once one has recognized that, between the confused multitude of historical societies and the single, but ideal concept of humanity, there are intermediaries, namely, social species. In the latter are united both the unity that all truly scientific research demands and the diversity that is given in the facts (Durkheim, 1982: 109).

The emphasis on emergent properties of social relations that cannot be reduced

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5) On the possibility of anti-reductionist consilience and Durkheim’s sociological naturalism based on emergent ontology and sociology of emergence, refer to Kim Myung-Hee(2015b). The concept of social causality that cannot be reduced to physical, biological or psychological levels can clearly be seen in his 1911 work. “Society is also of nature and yet dominates it. Not only do all the forces of the universe converge in society, but they also form a new synthesis which surpasses in richness, complexity and power of action all that went to form it. In a word, society is nature arrived at a higher point in its development, concentrating all its energies to surpass, as it were, itself” (Durkheim 1953, 97).
to individuals, even though they may depend on human action, is like a golden rule in establishing Durkheim’s sociology.

By virtue of this principle, society is not the mere sum of individuals, but the system formed by their association represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics. Undoubtedly no collective entity can be produced if there are no individual consciousness: this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. In addition, these consciousnesses must be associated and combined, but combined in a certain way. It is from this combination that social life arises and consequently it is this combination which explains it. By aggregating together, by interpenetrating, by fusing together, individuals give birth to a being, psychical if you will, but one which constitutes a psychical individuality of a new kind. [...] The group thinks, feels and acts entirely differently from the way its members would if they were isolated (Durkheim, 1982: 129).

Like Marx, Durkheim’s society/people model is also based on the historicity of modern division of labor in society.

Whilst having a physiognomy and personal activity which distinguishes him from others, he depends upon them in the same measure that he is distinguished from them, and consequently upon the same society which results from their union (Durkheim, 1933: 226).

In a society with mechanical solidarity, based on likeness of collective consciousness, society socializes the individual in one direction. On the other hand, in modern society with divided labor, an individual, who attains uniqueness, is differentiated from others but at the same time, depends on society through his or her relationship with others. In other words, societies and people gain an ontological break through the historical conditions of a society with divided labor. In short, both Marx and Durkheim shared the concept of ‘society’ as a relational existence, and considered the dynamism of social structure that cannot be reduced to mechanical causality to be the motive of historical development.
Such ontological perspective has important implications in resolving the society/people dichotomy, separating the objects of today’s social sciences and humanities. The dichotomy between social sciences that deal with ‘society’ and humanities that deal with ‘humans’ loses its logical ground. In fact, the juxtaposition between social structure and human agency, which has led to the division between a social science-based Korean studies and a humanities-based Korean studies, can be seen as a modification of the juxtaposition between social realism and social nominalism. However, in naturalist social science of Marx and Durkheim, there is no such binary opposition. For the two thinkers, ‘the social,’ centered on ‘relationships’ and ‘associations,’ is not simply the total sum of individuals but a form of unique relationships and a transformable emergent reality. In short, the social ontology of the two scholars shares a relational social paradigm as formulated through critical realism and the transformational model of social activity. Such idea endows consistency to the critical naturalism of the two, which takes into consideration both the unity and the autonomy of natural sciences and human sciences.

6) This is posited as a historical and scientific premise that can neither be reduced to ontic fallacy of reification and voluntarism, nor to epistemic fallacy of both methodological totalitarianism and methodological individualism (Kim, Myung-Hee 2015a). In fact, the insight offered by Durkheim by setting an ontological break between causes and reasons in *Suicide* clarifies the core aspects of the emergent phenomenon in the social world as proposed by Bhaskar (Pearce 2007, 55-63).

7) If this understanding is reasonable, then the paradigm of classical sociology as represented by Marx, Durkheim and Weber can legitimately be reconstructed into two sociological paradigms. On one hand, there is the anti-naturalist social science led by Weber, and on the other, naturalist social science (critical naturalism) of Marx and Durkheim. If an empirical and collectivist interpretation of Durkheim is rejected, then the formulation by R. Bhaskar (2007) can also be revised as follows (Kim, Myung-Hee 2015b, 292).

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<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Reformulation of four tendencies in social thought</th>
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<td><strong>Method</strong></td>
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<td>Durkheim</td>
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<td>Marx</td>
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3. Critical Naturalism of Marx and Durkheim

a) Natural Sciences and Human Sciences: Mutual Connotations of Science and Philosophy

Furthermore, the concept of ‘science’ as shared by Marx and Durkheim provides the possibility of advancing toward deepening of “depth-explanatory human sciences, of the sort that Marx inaugurated but did not complete” (Bhaskar 1989, xvi). In order to demonstrate this, it is necessary to first of all look at the concept of ‘positivist science’ or ‘science’ as used by the two scholars. Neither one of them supported the dichotomous division between science and philosophy, and natural sciences and human sciences. The ‘secession’ from previous philosophical traditions has been expressed by the two through the concepts of ‘scientific dialectics’ (K. Marx) and ‘scientific rationalism’ (E. Durkheim), respectively. However, Marx did not accept ‘science without critique’ nor ‘critique without science.’ At the same time that he opposed philosophical idealism as represented by Hegel, he also criticized the empiricism of economics of his time, and was able to reach “resolving of philosophy through science” and “transition of philosophy into science.” In other words, the double-sided challenge of ‘avoiding and realizing philosophy’ contained the attempts to establish science in regard to society and history by using the method of natural science. In this regard, ‘Marxism’ can be regarded as an inheritor of natural science (Edgely 1998, 396).

The idea of ‘avoiding and realizing philosophy’ can similarly be found in Durkheim’s emphasis on sociology as ‘science of science.’ He also did not support the dichotomous division between philosophy and science. “Philosophy, unless it relies upon positive sciences, can only be a form of literature” (Durkheim 1982, 237), and science is destined to provide a necessary foundation for philosophy (Durkheim 1982, 239). In this regard, Durkheim said that sociology was the appropriate solution to the metaphysical problems philosophers grappled with, and

8) Part 3 is a newly reconstructed version of some of the discussions in Part 7 of my doctoral dissertation, “Social Science Methodologies of Marx and Durkheim: Focusing on ‘Explanatory Critique’ of Capital and Suicide”, from the perspective of alleviating the tension of the ‘Two Cultures’ and seeking possibility of an integrated Korean studies.
could contribute to the reconstruction of those problems (Kim, Myung-Hee 2015b, 298). For both Marx and Durkheim, philosophy and science were interpenetrative.

b) Facts and Values, Nomothesis and Idiography: Historical Explanation

The hardened fact/value dichotomy, which has strengthened the barrier between social sciences and humanities, can also be resolved through the theory of explanatory critique. According to this idea of ‘explanatory critique,’ the social world consists not just of social objects but also of beliefs people have about those objects. Therefore, any research that seeks to investigate and explain the social world, in itself, involves critique as well as judgements on value and action. Simply put, social science, in which the object and subject of knowledge form a tight knot, fundamentally has emancipatory impulses, and the explanatory power of social science knowledge triggers a yearning for emancipation (Bhaskar 1986, 169). Such argument made important contributions in that it reasoned against ‘value-neutral thesis,’ which is the ideal of positivist social science, and its root, ‘Hume’s law.’

Marx contemplated, more than anyone else, on the fact that science in general, including natural sciences, has historicity, that ideology along with its social determination also has historicity, and that, therefore, scientific development and social development determine one another. In Marx’s model of production, science is a part of production activity and understood as a form of praxis to consciously transform the world. Marx’s criticism of false consciousness, from his early works to Capital, is positioned on the continuum of his criticism of religion. The tendency to replace irrational beliefs with rational ones is the core motif behind the theory of social form and his criticism of fetishism in Capital. Fetishism is basically a mechanism of – dichotomous - substitution that demolishes the social level that exists between the laws of physics and laws of action. Reification is an expression of ontology of statis, and by taking on the form of negating the possibility of change and freedom, justifies existing social relations. In this sense, criticism of

9) In his 1911 paper, Durkheim affirmed that the first of his aims of writing his work was to show how sociology can help resolve a problem of philosophy (Durkheim 1953, 80).
fetishism is a criticism of social relations, and also takes on the role of a kind of meta-criticism of the wrongful scientific premises those social relations rely upon. Therefore, Marx’s view of science has praxistic significance in that it criticizes the view absolutizing objectivity of science, regarding science to be independent and value-neutral from humans and society, and emphasizing the infinite utility of science and technology. It is a criticism of positivist and utilitarian perspective of science.\(^\text{10}\)

In Durkheim’s model of division of labor, science is a collective activity, and scientific knowledge is the result of collective effort as well as being a form of social consciousness. Historically, the duty of contemplative truth sought by scientific knowledge was to give nutrition to collective consciousness (Durkheim 1983, 92). Furthermore, Durkheim clearly asserted in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912) that the origin of scientific knowledge was in religion, and that the origin of religion was in society. Such thesis clearly indicates that the essence of religion, and even science, is positioned not in an ideological space, but within the space of action – i.e., in the space of collective praxis. According to Durkheim, the role of social sciences is in showing the rules and regulations of legitimate actions based on judgement of realities. Through such process, the relationship between science, morals and religion is reconstructed within an inclusive relationship.

Of course, Durkheim’s moral science is clearly different from that of Marx in the sense that it considers research into the ideal and value as being an important task of social sciences. Whereas Marx focused on clarifying the source of inevitable false consciousness – i.e., ideology - that is structurally produced and reproduced, Durkheim proposed that individualism/socialism be considered a form of an ideal to be sought by modern society and be contemplated upon as a solemn social fact. However, if an ideal is considered to be a part of social reality, just as ideology is a part of reality, then it is not easy to differentiate between the two, at least from the dimension of ontology and axiology. Most importantly, an important implication of Durkheim’s perception of science is that he argued

\(^{10}\) For a particularly noteworthy interpretation of Marx’s theory of science, refer to Lee, Joong-Won (2004).
value,’ which had been dismissed as a subjective area under the objective versus subjective dichotomy, to have come from social sources, and that he revealed judgement of reality and judgement of value to be a process of social judgement located within a helical relationship. He was therefore able to effectively argue against judgmental relativism that the thesis of value-neutrality inevitable ran into.11)

The realist historical explanatory model of the two thinkers also resolves the binary opposition between nomothetic and idiographic methodologies. Fundamentally, this binary opposition between the two approaches, which has separated natural sciences (and social sciences) from humanities, emerged from the concept of empiricist ‘laws.’ This opposition goes back to the slogan, ‘nature explains and the mind understands’ of Wilhelm Dilthey, who lay the foundation of the division between natural sciences and the science of the mind. The opposition was further reinforced later under the hegemony of the standard scientific model. A major example is Carl Hempel’s covering-law model, according to which scientific explanation is said to be about proving cases of scientific laws, and which shares Hume’s concept of causality based on regularity determinism. However, empirical ‘regularity’ expressed as such cannot be equated with ‘laws.’

Unlike ‘law’ as a regular continuation of events or the positivist concept of ‘law’ that deductively captures individual cases in general laws, ‘law’ from the perspective of realism refers to natural necessity, tendency and causal power that generate a phenomenon. ‘Historical law’ established by Marx and Durkheim can also be understood as a concept of realist causality or emergent causality — rather than ‘empirical regularity.’ This is because scientific explanation within theory of history of the two scholars emphasizes narration of causal mechanisms and not deduction from universal laws.

For example, the two thinkers, both highlighting the new conditions that arose from modern society, envisioned “free development of each” (K. Marx) and “ideal

11) Durkheim made it clear that scientific judgement of value is mutually subjective ‘about’ reality and that therefore, it is subjugated to the process of objective ‘social judgement.’ “All these values exist then, in a sense, outside me. Thus when we are in disagreement with others over judgements in such matters we try to communicate our convictions. [...] Implicitly we recognize that these judgements correspond to some objective reality upon which agreement can and should be reached. These sui generis realities constitute values, and it is to these realities that value judgements refer” (Durkheim 1953, 81).
of human dignity” (E. Durkheim) respectively, as ‘historical law’ and ‘historical tendency.’  This is guaranteed by the meta-theoretical assumption of critical realism, according to which causality of social science need to be analyzed as tendencies that manifest themselves only in open systems. Under this perspective, whether mechanisms of class struggle innate within capitalism will actualize or whether the mechanisms of individualization caused by modern society will depends on concrete circumstances and social conditions. At this juncture, it is not difficult to find the logical convergence between Marx’s ‘scientific’ socialism and Durkheim’s ‘scientific’ sociology.

12) From the view of ‘law as a tendency,’ the possibility of evidence/counter-evidence of ‘prediction’ based on ‘empirical regularity’ cannot become a criteria in proving the ability of explanation of law-like statement of the two thinkers in regard to laws of history. It can be said that both Marx and Durkheim highlighted the ‘causal power’ of the working class (Marx) and occupational groups (Durkheim) as collective agencies that can control the personality and moral subordination – alienation (Marx) and anomie (Durkheim) - brought on by economic determination of modern society.

13) To encapsulate, in the case of Marx, there was a development toward scientific socialism, centered on his criticism of inevitable false consciousness, i.e., ideology, whereas in the case of Durkheim, he headed towards scientific sociology, centered on his criticism of reductionism and methodological individualism.

c) Potential of Depth-Explanatory Human Sciences:
   Depth-Explanatory Critique

The social science methodologies of Marx and Durkheim create potential for mutually complementary linkage in the process of logical reasoning based on depth-explanatory critique that encompasses social theoretical criticism as well as social science-based explanation. Scientific investigation, which is led by the question ‘why?’, usually leads to an orderly explanation, and this, in turn, becomes potential for emancipation. This is the rationality of depth-explanatory critique as systematized by Bhaskar. In other words, social science is considered to be an ‘explanatory but at the same time critical’ social theory that plans human emancipation.

For example, Marx ‘criticized’ the fact that Aristotle thought slaves to be not humans but rather ‘living tools,’ but he also ‘explained’ that it was inevitable in light of the social structure of Aristotle’s time. Marx ‘criticized’ that commodity fetishism degraded humans to mere objects, but at the same time ‘explained’ the
social structure that caused such commodity fetishism. Marx also ‘criticized’ that ideology concealed contradictions in reality and thereby was in the interests of the ruling class, but also ‘explained’ that such circumstances were structural and inevitable. Nonetheless, these explanations change individuals and society.\footnote{For example, if the reason and the fact that desires cannot be satisfied are explained, then the desires will become stronger or disappear, and the changed individual desires will render a different value judgement on the issues related to the given industrial system or the Earth environment (Kim, Jin-Up 2004, 201-202).}

To sum up, the epitome of Marx’s scientific method is in his criticism of ‘inevitable false consciousness’ and through his criticism of commodity fetishism in \textit{Capital}, he was able to pioneer the road to explanatory criticism, conditioned by – not the impossibility of social science but the possibility there of – the emergent properties of the social world in which the subject is included in the object.

Durkheim’s model of explanatory critique originated in \textit{Suicide}. His moral science project, i.e., naturalist ethics, expands the potential of depth-explanatory criticism to various problems of the complex contemporary society. For instance, Durkheim ‘criticized’ egoism, but also ‘explained’ that it was the result of collective consciousness arising out of new social conditions – namely division of labor – that can also enable sympathy toward others. He ‘criticized’ that anomic suicide was a disease of infiniteness where one lost the goals of one’s desires, but also ‘explained’ that it was the result of structural causes whereby the economy lacked moral constraint. He ‘criticized’ that feelings of emotional states of pessimism and sadness were abnormal conditions that went against genuine character of consciousness, however, he also ‘explained’ that they themselves were the logical consequence of the mental state of a society. These explanations change us by telling us what needs to be healed, in which direction.

We rediscover it[nature] through science, we re-think it and understand why it is thus. [...] It is freely desiring this order, assenting through an understanding of the cause. [...] We liberate ourselves through understanding.; there is no other means of liberation. Science is the wellspring of our autonomy (Durkheim 1961, 115-116).
It is sociology which by discovering the laws of social reality will permit us to direct historical evolution with greater reflection than in the past; for we can change nature, whether moral or physical, only by conforming to its law. [...] At the same time that they proclaim the necessity of things, the sciences place in our hands the means to dominate that necessity (Durkheim 1978, 75).

This is the helical relationship between explanation and emancipation, as shown by the explanatory critique of Marx and Durkheim and logically proven by critical realism. They all share the view of truth of critical realism whereby the purpose of knowledge is considered to lie in life and the purpose of explanation in emancipation. More strictly, it is possible to highlight once again the fault line cutting across the model of explanatory critique of the two thinkers at the level of explanation of deep investigations. The solidarity theory and criticism of anomie in *Suicide* provide a road for depth-explanatory critique that elucidates the source of the irrational sentiments and ills that actors located within social relations show. At the point where Marx viewed the collapse of all wrongful theoretical beliefs to be the necessary condition for emancipation, Durkheim emphasized that the collapse of theoretical beliefs was intertwined with the transformations of moral and sentimental relations that penetrate the depths of social relations. As made clearer in his *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912), Durkheim argued that transformation of social relations cannot proceed without the emergence of a new form of praxistic faith or of a collective ideal. The criticism of pessimism/irrationality in *Suicide* is particularly important, in light of the historical development and the complex differentiation of contemporary capitalism. This is because, as Collier said, “The frustration of the need may be not only generated by some social institution, but also necessary for the reproduction of that institution.”(Collier 1994, 183) In other words, if such need, which is frustrated by capitalism, is a condition of capitalist activation, then cognitive enlightenment is merely a necessary condition of emancipation not a sufficient condition (Collier

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15) In the system established by Bhaskar, depth investigation is one that is about the emancipatory potential of species-beings that has not yet been realized within the power of humans and the community. It questions what conditions would allow those powers to become active (Bhaskar 2007, 220-221).
Durkheim’s naturalist ethics, by supporting “a work of reason transforming irrational into rational ones” (Collier 1994, 185), expands the potential of depth-explanatory human sciences.\footnote{In this regard, there are commonalities between a cognitive explanatory critique on false beliefs and an explanatory critique on failed needs. For a case study linking Durkheim’s sociology of emotions and naturalist ethics to the emotional ecosystem of the post-May 18th transitional justice, refer to Kim, Myung-Hee (2016).}

4. Conclusion and Prospects: Possibility of Integrated Korean Studies

This paper sought to graft critical naturalism of Marx and Durkheim to the efforts to overcome the ‘Two Cultures’ that divide contemporary Korean studies. Critical naturalism of the two thinkers illustrate a third way – one of anti-reductionist and anti-positivist naturalism – that can be reduced to neither hyper-naturalist reductionism nor anti-naturalist (scientistic) humanities. In particular, the relational paradigm of society and the explanatory critical theory of the two provide a meaningful reference point that can contribute to the paradigmatic re-integration of humanities and social sciences, going beyond the juxtapositions between social structure and human agency, science and philosophy, facts and values, and science-ness and humanities-ness.

Based on the above discussion, I will now attempt to derive the possibility of an integrated Korean studies based on critical naturalism of the two thinkers. Korean studies can be broadly defined as a ‘discipline regarding Korean society,’ however, in line with the context of this paper, integrated Korean studies includes the long-term aims under the following three dimensions. The theoretical aims should be 1) to fill the unnecessary gap between traditional ‘humanities-based national studies’ (國學’) research and policy- and reality-centered ‘social science-based Korean studies’ (韓國學), i.e., relieve the unnecessary antagonism between humanities and social sciences; 2) to integrate the different perspectives and methodologies of South Korea’s Korean studies and North Korea’s Chosŏn studies; and 3) to alleviate the divide between the ‘specificity’ of Korea and the
universality’ of world history.

First of all, the juxtaposition between the humanities-based ‘national studies’ (‘國學’) and social science-based ‘Korean studies’ (‘韓國學’), was further aggravated not just by the modern academic disciplinary system but also by the path dependency of colonialism and division, and by the structural reform of Seoul National University in 1975, when social sciences and humanities were institutionally separated, copying the American university/academic categorization. As a result, the practice of Korean studies dividing the political economy oriented research on one side and socio-culture oriented research on the other came to bar a more holistic perception of what is Korean. Relational social paradigm, common to both Marx and Durkheim, explains the inseparable knot between social structure and human behavior, thereby providing a consistent (social) ontological foundation within humanities and social sciences. Furthermore, the theory of explanatory critique of the two thinkers legitimately remind us that Korean studies is an analysis on ‘what is’ Korean as well as on ‘what ought to be,’ and that it can be a ‘science’ at the same time being a ‘philosophy.’

Secondly, the prospects of the two thinkers on integrated science open a door to alleviation of the antagonism of the ‘Two Cultures’ and to interdisciplinary thought in regard to the complex contemporary ‘Korean problem.’ In particular, the potential shown by depth-explanatory human sciences, attained by comprehending Marx and Durkheim in a mutually complementary way, is important in light of the reality of the country divided into the South and the North, and of its historicity. As many recent research on historical trauma and social suffering highlight, the division system that has been in place for over 60 years after the war has led to a crisis in the relationships of people constituting this regime and also to a crisis of humaneness and mentality. For example, one aspect of social problems arising from the division system being reproduced into mental problems can be seen in the high suicide rate of South Koreans (Kim Myung-Hee, 2012) and suicide among North Korean refugees. Therefore, a post-division challenge would be to seek careful reflection and unified intervention into the society-person relationship that is bound by a certain historical and geographical space beyond the intellectual borders of historiography and social sciences.
In this regard, Marx and Durkheim open up a road to consilient human sciences that can prepare for social integration after reunification, going beyond the intellectual division of labor between historiography, sociology and psychology. Furthermore, the bonding of Marx’s scientific socialism and Durkheim’s scientific sociology can act as a bridge leading toward a ‘complete Korean studies’ – one that has developed within the traditions of socialism and liberalism - that encompasses the humanities and social sciences assets of South Koreans, North Koreans and overseas Koreans. If the potential of science and technology of North Korea, which the North is proudly promoting as a nation-wide agenda, is taken into account, then the critical naturalism of Marx and Durkheim can be used as a foundation of philosophy of science that unites the culture of science of the North and the South.

Thirdly, the search for a unifying social science is ultimately related to the efforts to create knowledge, theory and methodology that are befitting to the historical reality of the division system. In terms of methodology, the models of historical explanation of *Capital* and *Suicide* can go beyond the binary oppositions of history and theory, and nomothesis and idiography, to become an alternative basis that can lead to the universalization of what is Korean.17) The model of historical explanation in *Capital* provides us with an explanation and critique on the structure and dynamics of contemporary capitalism, including the issues of the so-called ‘risk society,’ that are still very much valid, while the historical comparative methodology of *Suicide* shows the potential to analyze both the forms of solidarity in various ‘societies’ and their historical and moral conditions. Therefore, the creative convergence between the realist historical methodologies of the two intellectuals can reveal the inner structures of a ‘broken down society’ – with the highest suicide rate – caused by the interlinking of historical conditions of neoliberal capitalism and the division system, and also support the creation of counter tendencies.

In short, critical naturalism of Marx and Durkheim allows the re-integration of the knowledge paradigms of social sciences and humanities, and provides abundant

17) A more detailed reasoning on this will be my next task. In regard to the model of historical explanation (RRRE) of Marx and Durkheim, refer to Parts 5 and 6 of Kim, Myung-Hee (2014).
philosophy of science resources to promote a more complete Korean studies that encompasses the historicity and scientificity of the divided society, and both the South and the North.
Works Cited


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